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We develop an overlapping generation model of rural agricultural households to examine 
whether tenure security and subsistence needs influence the choice between unexploited 
topsoil and investment in children’s human capital as the mode of transfer of wealth. A 
unique dataset from Bangladesh finds that tenure security is associated with greater topsoil 
conservation and lower human capital investment. Therefore, there exists a tradeoff between 
these two modes of transfer. We suggest that increased public expenditure on schooling, 
which substitutes private expenditure, may lower the pressure on land and soil resources.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Rural areas of developing countries are highly dependent on agriculture for both income and 
employment (Malik 1999). Around 70 percent people from low-income countries live in rural 
areas where agriculture is the principal economic activity, contributing around 32 percent of the 
gross domestic product and employing nearly 80 percent of the workforce (World Bank 2015). 
Moreover, low per-capita arable land results in high incidences of poverty in those countries; 
only 0.22 hectares of land are available per-capita and around 47 percent of people live below 
the $1.90/day poverty line in lower income countries (World Bank 2015).1 Hardcore poverty 
often forces farmers, especially smallholders, to use their limited land resources intensively to 
meet even subsistence consumption needs. This high dependence on land-intensive agricultural 
production results in increased pressures on different attributes of land quality, such as topsoil.  
Topsoil, which is an important determinant of agricultural productivity, is often conserved 
and shared from one generation to the next (Bre´chet and Lambrecht 2011). Common soil 
conservation practices include stone terracing and tree plantation. However, the benefits of such 
conservation efforts may take years to be realized (Reardon and Vosti 1995); and, often tenure 
insecurity results in overexploitation of the topsoil to maximize the immediate returns at the cost 
of future damages (Ray 2005). The absence of proper land and other important markets in the 
rural areas of developing countries may limit the eventual financial returns to conservation. Yet, 
rural agricultural households devote considerable amounts of time and effort for topsoil 
conservation, often as a form of stewardship for future generations (Besley 1995; Brasselle, 
Gaspart, and Platteau 2002; Deninger and Jin 2006; Ervin and Ervin 1982; Reardon and Vosti 
1995). This suggests the presence of altruistic behavior within the family (e.g., Becker 1981), 
and we therefore consider such intra-household altruism as the key incentive for conserving the 
topsoil. 
The lack or improper enforcement of land tenure security often contributes to topsoil 
degradation through reduced incentives for conservation effort (Deininger, Jin, and Yadav 2013; 
Deininger and Jin 2006; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003; Kabubo-Mariara 2007; Ray 2005). 
Consequently, tenure security can play a central role in influencing the topsoil conservation 
                                                          
1 In 2012, 47 percent of the population of low-income countries still lived on less than US$1.90 (2011 PPP) a day 
per capita, and 74 percent lived on less than US$3.10 (2011 PPP) a day per capita (World Bank 2015). Low-income 
countries are those in which 2014 GNI per capita was $1,045 or less.  
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decision (IFAD 2008; UNECA 2009). Land tenure, which refers to the social relations and 
institutions that govern access to and control over land and related resources, determines who 
can use the land resources, for how long and under what conditions (IFAD 2008). Consistent 
with this definition, we empirically define tenure security in terms of owned land as proportion 
of total operated agricultural land by a household. In many developing countries including 
Bangladesh, agricultural land rental transactions are mostly informal and, therefore, represent a 
reasonable form of tenure insecurity (e.g., Eskander and Barbier 2016; Ray 2005).2 Depending 
on the degree of tenure security, the altruistic current generation may be interested in alternative 
modes of transfer to the future generation, such as investment in human capital of the future 
generation. 
We develop an overlapping generations (OLG) model of a representative rural agricultural 
household to explore the linkage between intra-household altruism, tenure security and topsoil 
conservation. The current generation maximizes an altruistic inter-temporal utility function by 
making labor allocation, consumption and transfer decisions. At the beginning of the second 
period, the current generation allocates its total labor time between agricultural production and 
topsoil conservation, and allocates agricultural income between consumption and human capital 
investment. It transfers the agricultural land with the remaining topsoil to the future generation at 
the end of the second period. Thus, after meeting its production and consumption needs, the 
current generation may end up transferring various combination of unexploited topsoil and 
human capital investment to the future generation (e.g., Tomes 1982).  
Our theoretical analysis focuses on substitutability between unexploited topsoil and human 
capital investment as the method of transfer. Based on the theoretical findings, we hypothesize 
that households with greater tenure security have greater conservation investment and lower 
human capital investment. We use the Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
(HIES) dataset to investigate these hypotheses for the agricultural households of Bangladesh.  
The impact of tenure security on topsoil and land conservation has been widely studied in the 
literature (Place 2009; Gebremedhin and Swinton 2003). Potential sources of tenure insecurity 
include lack of land titles (Bezabih, Holden, and Mannberg 2012), short-term tenancy contracts 
(Bandiera 2007; Ray 2005), lack of transferability (Besley 1995), risk of expropriation 
                                                          
2 Similarly, Ray (2005) considers share tenancy as a measure of tenure security. It identifies that the tenant-farmers 
might overexploit the land to maximize immediate returns even at the cost of future damages, and under-supply 
long-run productivity improving investments in land, than the owner-farmers.  
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(Deininger and Jin 2006) and customary gender-biased inheritance practices (Lovo 2016). 
However, the empirical relationship is inconclusive, and depends on the specific case under 
study (Besley and Ghatak 2009). One possible reason is that the alternative modes of wealth 
transfer by households have not been considered. This is the first investigation to consider how 
tenure security influences the choice between unexploited topsoil and human capital investment 
as the mode of intergenerational transfer of wealth.  
We find that a unit increase in tenure security has significant associations with a 0.54 percent 
increase in conservation investment and 0.16 percent decrease in human capital investment. That 
is, Bangladeshi agricultural households experience a tradeoff between conservation and human 
capital investments emerging from tenure security: given the level of tenure security, an increase 
(decrease) in conservation investment must be accompanied by a decrease (increase) in human 
capital investment, and vice-versa. Substitutability between them may lead to important 
implications for developing countries in terms of both private educational expenditure and land 
resource management. Since public and private investments on conservation and human capital 
investments are complementary, public policies that target the conservation and management of 
land and soil resources may result in higher private investment on children’s human capital 
development. Similarly, higher public investment in education may increase conservation 
investment.  
The content of the remainder of the article is as follows. Section II develops the OLG model 
of rural agricultural households and analyzes the effect of tenure security on optimal decisions. 
Section III specifies the empirical strategy. Section IV provides a brief discussion of data used 
for empirical analysis. Section V discusses the main empirical results. Finally, Section VI 
summarizes and concludes by discussing the key policy implications.  
 
II. AN OLG MODEL OF RURAL AGRICULTURAL HOUSEHOLDS 
The overlapping generations (OLG) model in this paper includes two modes of transfer: 
unexploited topsoil and human capital investment (i.e., educational expenditure), in the context 
of a rural developing economy. Our interest is to determine how the choice is made between 
these alternative modes of transfer and to identify factors critical to this choice.  
The rural economy consists of 𝑀 homogeneous agricultural households, which can be 
represented by a single household. At any point in time, the representative household consists of 
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two overlapping generations: young and old. The current generation, denoted by the subscript 1, 
is born in time 𝑡 and lives two consecutive periods 𝑡 (young age) and 𝑡 + 1 (old age).3 It does not 
earn in time 𝑡, rather lives on the contribution from the previous generation. The current and 
future generations overlap in time 𝑡 + 1, when the current generation earns agricultural income, 
and makes consumption, labor allocation and transfer decisions. 
The current generation uses its fixed endowments of land and labor for agricultural 
production. It inherits a fixed amount of land with a given topsoil depth and tenure security from 
the previous generation at the end of time 𝑡. On retirement from economic activities at the end of 
time 𝑡 + 1, it transfers the land to the future generation with remaining topsoil depth. The 
altruistic current generation may spend a part of its total labor time in topsoil conservation, 
which does not directly affect current agricultural production but prevents soil depletion and thus 
indirectly influences the production of the future generation. 
Land tenure security is often missing, or not properly defined and enforced, in the rural areas 
of developing countries (de Janvry et al. 2015). We consider an exogenous measure of tenure 
security, 𝜃, which is continuous within the range [0,1], where higher values of 𝜃 indicate greater 
tenure security, and vice-versa, ∀𝜃 ∈ [0,1]. Among the extreme cases, 𝜃 = 1 implies complete 
tenure security, and 𝜃 = 0 implies zero tenure security. We assume that 𝜃 is time-independent, 
i.e., the degree of tenure security is fixed across generations. Empirical analyses, predominantly 
on sub-Saharan Africa, provide mixed evidence of direction on the relationship between tenure 
security and soil conservation (Deininger and Jin 2006). While secured tenure can potentially 
increase soil conservation investment, such investments could also lead to increased tenure 
security (Besley 1995). However, empirically the direction of relationship depends on the 
specific type of investment and definition of tenure security (Lovo 2016). As has been outlined 
in the following sections, we empirically define tenure security in terms of owned land as 
proportion of operated land and conservation investment in terms of money spent on compost 
and forest seedlings. While these types of investments are productivity-enhancing, they are not 
necessarily security-enhancing (e.g., Deininger and Jin 2006). Moreover, because of the absence 
of a properly functioning land sales market and no apparent governmental policy on the 
intergenerational transfer of land in Bangladesh, user rights of agricultural land are typically 
                                                          
3 Similarly, the future generation, denoted by the subscript 2, is born in time 𝑡 + 1 and lives two consecutive periods 
𝑡 + 1 (young age) and 𝑡 + 2 (old age).  
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transferred through inheritance, making the security-enhancing role of conservation investments 
less likely at least according to the empirical definitions we use in this paper. 
The current generation maximizes a utility function, which incorporates Stone-Geary 
preferences (SGP) with respect to its subsistence consumption needs as well as altruistic 
concerns for the future generation. The present generation gains utility from its consumption 
above the subsistence level and altruistic utility from the welfare of the future generation. Let 
𝑐1,𝑡+1 denote its consumption in time 𝑡 + 1, 𝑐̅ the subsistence level of consumption, and 𝑈2 the 
utility of the future generation. The inter-temporal utility of the current generation is:  
(1)              𝑈1 = 𝑢(𝑐1,𝑡+1 − 𝑐̅) + 𝜌𝑈2,   
where 𝜌 > 0 denotes the weight on the altruistic utility component. For simplicity, we assume 
𝑐1,𝑡 = 𝑐̅ (i.e., the current generation consumes at the subsistence level in time 𝑡) and 𝑐1,𝑡+1 > 𝑐̅ 
(i.e., the current generation consumes above the subsistence level in time 𝑡 + 1).4 Therefore, 
utility from consumption in time 𝑡 drops out of the utility function (1) since 𝑢(𝑐1,𝑡 − 𝑐̅) =
𝑢(0) = 0. The function 𝑢(∙) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly concave in its 
arguments, i.e., 𝑢′ > 0; 𝑢′′ < 0.  
To derive the indirect utility function 𝑣 of the future generation, we evaluate 𝑈2 at the 
optimal values of the choice variables of the current generation.5 𝑣 is the welfare of the future 
generation taking account of their decisions, which are functions of initial conditions determined 
by the transfers made to them (e.g., Amacher et al. 2002). Since the current generation either 
transfers the unexploited topsoil (𝑥𝑡+1) or invests in human capital (𝑚𝑡+1), we have:
6  
(2)              𝑈2 ≡ 𝑣(𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑚𝑡+1),       𝑣𝑖 > 0; 𝑣𝑖𝑖 < 0; 𝑖 = 𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑚𝑡+1.  
The current generation cultivates its inherited land (𝐴) with a given topsoil depth (𝑥𝑡) using 
on-farm physical labor (𝑙1,𝑡+1) and a vector of all other inputs (𝐵) in time 𝑡 + 1. Since the rural 
                                                          
4 For simplicity, we assume that the consumption of the previous generation in time 𝑡 incorporates 𝑐1,𝑡. This 
simplification, i.e., 𝑐1,𝑡 = 𝑐̅, is common in OLG models (e.g., Dam 2011), and it does not affect the tradeoff between 
the modes of transfer we investigate. In addition, 𝑐1,𝑡+1 > 𝑐̅ necessarily implies that the current generation derives 
utility from its own consumption in time 𝑡 + 1. 
5 By symmetry, the inter-temporal SGP of the future generation is 𝑈2 = 𝑢(𝑐2,𝑡+2 − 𝑐̅) + 𝜌 𝑈3. 
6 These two types of investment become comparable within our utility maximization framework. Benefits coming 
from these investments must be compared in terms of resulting marginal utility.  
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agricultural households often have limited capital, which is generally fixed and non-
accumulating, we normalize 𝐴 ≡ 1 and 𝐵 ≡ 1.7 The agricultural production function, 𝑞1,𝑡+1, is:  
(3)              𝑞1,𝑡+1 = 𝑞(𝑙1,𝑡+1; 𝑥𝑡),   𝑞
′ > 0, 𝑞′′ < 0,
𝜕𝑞′
𝜕𝑥𝑡
> 0.   
The production function increases at a non-increasing rate with respect to 𝑙1,𝑡+1 and 𝑥𝑡. An 
increase in 𝑙1𝑡+1 may lead to increased output but at a declining rate. We assume 𝑙1,𝑡+1 > 0 since 
agriculture is the only source of income.8 Topsoil, 𝑥𝑡, complements the crop productivity of 
labor. That is, additional soil depth improves the marginal productivity of labor, and vice-
versa.9,10  
The use of labor for agriculture degrades the topsoil depth at an accelerating rate, which may 
induce the altruistic current generation in topsoil conservation. Following Bulte and van Soest 
(2001), we consider that it allocates the labor time, 𝐿 > 0, between agricultural production 
(𝑙1,𝑡+1) and conservation effort (𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ): 𝐿 = 𝑙1,𝑡+1 + 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 , 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ≥ 0.11 Let 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑥𝑡+1, 
respectively, denote the current and future generation’s endowments of topsoil depth. 
Conservation effort and tenure security determine the change in topsoil depth: 𝑔 = 𝑔(𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ; 𝜃). 
Thus, topsoil depth at the end of time 𝑡 + 1 is:  
(4)              𝑥𝑡+1 = 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑔(𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ; 𝜃), 𝑔′ ≥ 0, 𝑔′′ ≤ 0; 
𝜕𝑔′
𝜕𝜃
> 0.  
Conservation effort 𝑙1𝑡+1
𝑥  may increase 𝑔(. ) at a non-increasing rate. Moreover, tenure security 𝜃 
has a beneficial effect on the marginal effect of 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥  on 𝑔(. ). This assumption, 
𝜕𝑔′
𝜕𝜃
> 0, follows 
                                                          
7 Consistent with a set of forestry literature (e.g., Koskela, Ollikainen, and Puhakka (2002) and Olson and Knapp 
(1997)), we do not include the physical capital without losing any insight since we focus on the rural developing 
economies. 
8 Including separate agricultural and non-agricultural activities simply complicates the model without contributing to 
our qualitative results. Among the papers making such distinctions include Narain, Gupta, and van’ t Veld (2008). 
On the other hand, Barbier (2010) considers only the agricultural labor allocation.  
9 Among others, Barbier (1990), Barbier and Bishop (1995) and Grepperud (1997) use similar production functions.  
10 This assumption is realistic especially for the case of Bangladesh, where, albeit very low per-capita farm size, 
fertile land contributes to higher rice productivity (Rahman 2010).  
11 Bulte and van Soest (2001) assume that rural households can indirectly enhance the regeneration of natural capital 
(i.e., topsoil in our model) by allocating a part of their labor time for conservation. Again, our approach resembles 
the technology choice approach in Barbier (1990), who considers a conventional vector of input package as well as 
the choice of adopting an alternative package of soil conservation method to determine the remaining topsoil depth. 
Instead, we consider the allocation of labor time between agriculture and conservation effort.  
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the fact that, since sharecropping is the dominant form of land rental in Bangladesh, and since 
renters may produce lower crop per unit of land than the owner-operators (e.g., Shaban 1987), 
agricultural household’s incentive to conserve the topsoil may vary depending on tenure security.  
The current generation earns real agricultural income 𝑞1,𝑡+1 in time 𝑡 + 1, which it allocates 
between own consumption (𝑐1,𝑡+1), and human capital investment (𝑚𝑡+1).
12 Therefore, the 
budget equation in time 𝑡 + 1 is:  
(5)              𝑐1,𝑡+1 = 𝑞1,𝑡+1 − 𝑚𝑡+1.  
Since the capital market is imperfect in the rural economy, we assume that the market interest 
rate is zero (e.g., Fernandez 2006). Since the current generation does not live beyond the end of 
time 𝑡 + 1, we assume that it does not save, rather, it may invest in human capital development 
alongside financing the subsistence consumption of the future generation.13  
The current generation maximizes its lifetime utility (1) subject to the constraints (2)–(5) and 
inequality restrictions 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ≥ 0 and 𝑚𝑡+1 ≥ 0 by choosing consumption (𝑐1,𝑡+1), labor (𝑙1,𝑡+1), 
conservation effort (𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ) and human capital investment (𝑚𝑡+1). After all possible 
replacements, the maximization problem becomes: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ,𝑚𝑡+1
𝑈1 = 𝑢(𝑞(𝐿 − 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ; 𝑥𝑡) − 𝑐̅ − 𝑚𝑡+1) + 𝜌𝑣(𝑚𝑡+1, 𝑥𝑡 + 𝑔(𝑙1𝑡+1
𝑥 ; 𝜃)), 
𝑠. 𝑡., 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ≥ 0, 𝑚𝑡+1 ≥ 0. 
Optimal values of the choice variables, 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗ and 𝑚𝑡+1
∗ , are implicitly determined by the first-
order conditions, 𝜌𝑣𝑥𝑔
′ ≤ 𝑢′𝑞′ and 𝑣𝑚 ≤ 𝑢
′. The current generation decides on labor-
conservation and consumption-human capital tradeoffs at the equality of their corresponding 
marginal benefits and opportunity costs. First, 𝜌𝑣𝑥𝑔
′ ≤ 𝑢′𝑞′ governs the labor-conservation 
tradeoff, where 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗ > 0 if this expression binds. Marginal benefit of conservation effort, 
𝜌𝑣𝑥𝑔
′, refers to current generation’s discounted marginal utility from conservation effort. On the 
other hand, the opportunity cost of conservation effort, 𝑢′𝑞′, corresponds to the effect of labor on 
                                                          
12 For simplicity, we assume that 𝑐1,𝑡+1 incorporates the consumption of the future generation in time 𝑡 + 1.  
13 This assumption implies that the current generation necessarily spends its unspent money from time 𝑡 + 1 on 
human capital investment. Therefore, subsequent analysis still holds even if we assume positive savings. However, it 
will only complicate the conceptual framework intended to derive testable hypotheses, which can be then 
empirically tested using the available data from Bangladesh.  
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the consumption above the subsistence level. Next, 𝜌𝑣𝑚 ≤ 𝑢
′ governs the consumption-human 
capital tradeoff, where 𝑚𝑡+1
∗ > 0 if this expression binds. The marginal benefit, 𝜌𝑣𝑚, refers to 
current generation’s discounted marginal utility from human capital investment. The opportunity 
cost, 𝑢′, refers to the marginal utility of consumption in time 𝑡 + 1 by the current generation.  
However, the optimal transfer decision requires simultaneously solving the first-order 
conditions, which yield a system of equations, according to: 
(6)              𝑣𝑥𝑔
′ ⋛ 𝑣𝑚𝑞
′,  
where 
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗ ≡ 𝑣𝑥𝑔
′ and 
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
∗ ≡ 𝑣𝑚𝑞
′, respectively, denote current generation’s marginal 
utilities from unexploited topsoil and human capital investment. Condition (6) implies that 
current generation’s labor allocation choices, 𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗ and 𝑙1,𝑡+1
∗ , determine its transfer choices, 
𝑥𝑡+1
∗  and 𝑚𝑡+1
∗ . Thus, alternative uses of labor work as alternative sources of altruistic utility: 
conservation effort increases topsoil transfer, and agricultural labor increases human capital 
investment.  
We have four potential solutions to household’s transfer decisions: 
1. No altruism case. This is the case where the current generation does not make any 
intergenerational transfer. This case violates the altruism assumption of the model.  
2. Conservation investment only. First corner solution, 
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗ >
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
∗ , implies that the 
current generation substitutes human capital investment perfectly for conservation 
investment. It invests only in conservation and, therefore, does not experience any 
tradeoff due to altruism. 
3. Human capital investment only. Second corner solution, 
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗ <
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
∗ , implies that 
the current generation substitutes conservation investment perfectly for human capital 
investment. It invests only in human capital development and, therefore, similar to case 2, 
does not experience any tradeoff due to altruism. 
4.  Tradeoff between conservation and human capital investments. The interior solution, 
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗ =
𝑑𝑣∗
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
∗ , implies that the current generation invests in both conservation and 
human capital development. That is, it transfers a combination of them to the future 
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generation and, therefore, a tradeoff arises between these two imperfectly substitute 
modes of intergenerational transfer.   
 
Most human-induced land and soil degradations occur because of the interactions between 
the land and its users (Gerber, Nkonya, and von Braun 2014). Thus, characteristics of land users 
are important in studying the motivation behind soil conservation. In particular, we focus on the 
effect of tenure security, which has ambiguous relationship with soil conservation. As our 
introduction discusses, empirical evidence of the relationship between tenure security and soil 
conservation depends on the specific case under study. Proposition 1 summarizes the effect of 
tenure security on soil conservation effort in the presence of human capital investment as an 
alternative mode of transfer.  
 
Proposition 1. With increased tenure security, the current generation increases conservation 
effort, and, decreases human capital investment. That is,  
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗
𝑑𝜃
> 0 and 
𝑑𝑚𝑡+1
∗
𝑑𝜃
< 0.  
Proof. Assume that the second-order conditions are satisfied. Since 
𝜕2𝑈1
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 = 𝜌𝑣𝑥
𝜕𝑔′
𝜕𝜃
> 0 and 
𝜕2𝑈1
𝜕𝜃𝜕𝑚𝑡+1
= 0, we have 
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗
𝑑𝜃
> 0 and 
𝑑𝑚𝑡+1
∗
𝑑𝜃
< 0. 
Proposition 1, which summarizes the effects of tenure security 𝜃 on the optimal choices of 
conservation effort and human capital investment, states that the current generation increases 
conservation effort under greater tenure security, and, therefore, transfers more topsoil instead of 
investing more in human capital. As shown in Figure 1, optimal transfer decisions, 𝑥𝑡+1
∗  and 
𝑚𝑡+1
∗ , correspond to 𝜃 = 𝜃0. Overall, we have 𝑥𝑡+1 ⋛ 𝑥𝑡+1
∗  and 𝑚𝑡+1 ⋚ 𝑚𝑡+1
∗ ∀𝜃 ⋛ 𝜃0, so that 
the underlying tradeoff results in a negatively-slopped expansion path in the (𝑥𝑡+1, 𝑚𝑡+1)-space.  
Inclusion of human capital investment as an alternative mode yields a positive relationship 
between tenure security and soil conservation effort, which is consistent with a set of literature 
on land conservation investment in developing countries (e.g., Abdulai, Owusu, and Goetz 2011; 
Besley 1995; Deninger and Jin 2003; Feneske 2011). In fact, it allows the current generation to 
degrade the topsoil. Especially under insecure tenure, it might be interested in generating 
altruistic utility from human capital investment through topsoil degradation rather than from 
topsoil transfer through conservation effort. Hence, the lack of tenure security explains topsoil 
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degradation in the rural areas of many developing countries. Formally, let ∃𝜃∗ ∈ 𝜃 such that 
𝑥𝑡+1
∗ (𝜃∗) = 𝑥𝑡 and 𝑚𝑡+1
∗ > 0. Thus, since 
𝑑𝑙1,𝑡+1
𝑥 ∗
𝑑𝜃
> 0 implies 
𝑑𝑥𝑡+1
∗
𝑑𝜃
> 0, we must have 𝑥𝑡+1
∗ <
𝑥𝑡 ∀𝜃 < 𝜃
∗ which defines the range of tenure security associated with topsoil degradation. 
 
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
Based on the Proposition (1), we hypothesize that tenure security has a positive association with 
conservation investment and a negative association with human capital investment. To avoid any 
potential bias arising from multiple use of a plot of land, we restrict our estimation to agricultural 
plots only. Panels A and B in Figure 2 reveal that both our outcome variables, i.e., 
ln(conservation investment) and ln(human capital investment), are left-censored due to farmer’s 
participation decisions: a positive investment is observed only when a farmer decides to invest in 
either conservation or human capital development. This requires using a variant of type-II tobit 
model, as suggested in Greene (2012). First, we use a bivariate probit model to simultaneously 
estimate the inverse mills ratios household’s decisions to invest or not. A farmer 𝑖 invests 
according to the following bivariate probit model:  
(7𝑎)     𝐷(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑆𝑖, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝜂1𝑖)
(7𝑏)    𝐷(ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑇𝑆𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖 , 𝜂2𝑖)
,   
where 𝜂1𝑖~(0, 𝜎1
2),  𝜂2𝑖~(0, 𝜎2
2) and 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜂1, 𝜂2) = 𝜌. Binary outcome variables representing 
farmer’s willingness to invest, 𝐷(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖 and 𝐷(ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖, are defined as 𝐷(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖 = 1 if the 
farmer invests in conservation and 0 if not and 𝐷(ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖 = 1 if the farmer invests in human 
capital development and 0 if not. 𝑇𝑆𝑖 is tenure security, whereas 𝑧1𝑖 and 𝑧2𝑖 are the 
corresponding vectors of controls. We report these results in Appendix Table A1.  
The purpose of the bivariate probit model in (7a) and (7b) is to simultaneously estimate the 
inverse mills ratios 𝐼𝑀𝑅1 and 𝐼𝑀𝑅2. We then include 𝐼𝑀𝑅1 and 𝐼𝑀𝑅2 as additional explanatory 
variables when estimating the causal relationships between tenure security and investments in 
conservation and human capital development. However, since this is not a case of sample 
selection as the distributions are normal for all the nonzero values of the outcome variables 
(Greene 2012), we do not limit our estimation to any selected sample.  
We define tenure security in terms of owned and rented land. Agricultural households usually 
operate a combination of owned and rented agricultural lands, often without any formal 
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agreement with the owners of rented-in lands. For example, in 2008, 33.8 percent of rural 
households in Bangladesh rented at least a part of their total operated land, whereas 24.2 percent 
operated a combination of owned and rented lands and 9.6 percent operated only rented lands 
(BBS 2014). Considering this phenomenon pertinent to many developing countries, we measure 
tenure security as the proportion of owned-operated land to total operated land:  
𝑇𝑆 =
𝑎𝑖
𝑜
𝑎𝑖
𝑜+𝑎𝑖
𝑟 ∈ [0,1],  
where 𝑎𝑖
𝑜 and 𝑎𝑖
𝑟 denote owned-operated and rented-operated land, respectively.  
The advantage of this definition of tenure security is that it allows us to overcome the debate 
on the direction of relationship between tenure security and conservation investment (e.g. 
Deininger and Jin 2006). This concern over causal relationship arises because certain forms of 
soil conservation investments, such as planting trees, may also increase perceived tenure 
security, as farmers with insecure rights to the land might enhance their claims by making such 
long-term investments (Besley 1995). Our definition of tenure security avoids this possible 
endogenous relationship between conservation investments and perceived or enhanced tenure 
security.14 
However, because tenure security is defined in terms of owned-operated and rented-operated 
land, it is likely to be endogenous in terms of household characteristics (e.g., gender, age and 
schooling of the household head and composition of the household), access to agricultural assets 
(e.g., plough ownership) and dependency on agriculture (e.g., landholding and primary 
occupation) (Taslim and Ahmed 1992; Rahman 2010; Eskander and Barbier 2016). In other 
words, the size of owned land may be exogenously determined, but overall operated land will 
include rented land, the volume of which is likely to be endogenously determined within the 
system of equations determining the operated land and farming decisions of the household. 
Overcoming this endogeneity problem requires using a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model, 
which first applies two-stage least squares (2SLS) on each individual equation, and then uses the 
covariance matrix of the residuals retrieved from those 2SLS estimators when estimating the 
complete system of equations using a seemingly-unrelated regression model. The effects of 
                                                          
14 However, since the level of tenure security might differ across the plots of operated land, our assumption is valid 
only for household’s aggregate operated land, not for individual plots. Due to the lack of plot level data, this paper 
could not capture this potential source of endogeneity in tenure security. 
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tenure security on investments in soil conservation and human capital by the household 𝑖 are 
therefore analyzed by estimating through 3SLS the following system of equations:  
Stages 1 and 2. Compute 2SLS estimates for 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖, 𝑙𝑛(ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖 and 𝑇𝑆𝑖 by OLS method 
using the models 𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑇?̂?𝑖, 𝑧1𝑖, 𝜀1𝑖), 𝑙𝑛(ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖 = 𝑓(𝑇?̂?𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖 , 𝜀2𝑖) and 𝑇𝑆𝑖 =
𝑇𝑆(𝑧1𝑖, 𝑧2𝑖, 𝜀3𝑖), respectively. Then, estimate the covariance matrix of the residuals 
retrieved from these 2SLS estimates.  
Stage 3. Together, stages 1 and 2 describe the 2SLS estimation; whereas the stage 3 completes 
the 3SLS process by applying a seemingly-unrelated regression model for the complete 
system of equations:  
(8𝑎)     𝑙𝑛(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑇?̂?𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑧1𝑖 + 𝐼𝑀𝑅1 + 𝜖1𝑖,
(8𝑏)    𝑙𝑛(ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖 = 𝛼2 + 𝛽2𝑇?̂?𝑖 + 𝛾2𝑧2𝑖 + 𝐼𝑀𝑅2 + 𝜖2𝑖,
   
where 𝑧1 ≠ 𝑧2 so that the order condition is satisfied and the system of equations is identified.  
Outcome variables, ln(𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠)𝑖 and ln(ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑖, are logged conservation investment and logged 
per-student human capital investment, respectively.15 Conservation investment includes the 
money spent on forest seedling and compost fertilizer, both of which are common soil-enriching 
practices among the farmers in many developing countries including Bangladesh. The use of 
compost fertilizer and forest seedlings improves soil fertility and plant growth, and, 
consequently, controls the soil erosion and nutrient runoff (e.g., Bhattarai et al. 2011). On the 
other hand, we use household’s expenditure on children’s educational activities as the measure of 
monetary transfer to the future generation. HIES contains itemized data on each household’s 
private expenditure for children’s schooling such as money spent on admission, annual/session 
fees, registration, tuition, books and stationary, uniform and footwear, private tutoring, hostel 
expenses, transportation and tiffin costs. 
Parameters 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 represent the effects of estimated tenure security on conservation and 
human capital investments, and we expect to get ?̂?1 > 0 and ?̂?2 < 0. The zero-mean error terms 
are homoscedastic and independent across households: 𝜖𝑘𝑖~(0, 𝜎𝑘
2) ∀𝑘 = 1,2. However, errors are 
correlated across equations for a given household, 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜖𝑘, 𝜖𝜅) = 𝜎𝑘𝜅 ≠ 0 ∀𝑘 ≠ 𝜅. In this case, 
equation-by-equation ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates are consistent but inefficient, 
                                                          
15 Results are similar if we use logged per-student conservation investment instead of logged conservation 
investment. 
14 
 
whereas seemingly-unrelated regression (SUR) estimates obtained from 3SLS model are 
efficient through the use of feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) method (Cameron and 
Trivedi 2010; Greene 2012).  
Our empirical approach to estimating (8) involves specifying the components of the vectors 
𝑧1 and 𝑧2. We identify separate equation-specific controls, which, since 𝜎𝑘𝜅 ≠ 0, ensures the 
efficiency gains from using the simultaneous equations estimates (Cameron and Trivedi 2010; 
Greene 2012). Based on HIES data and the related literature on farm-level investment theory 
(e.g., Feder et al. 1992; Clay, Reardon, and Kangasniemi 1998; Gebremedhin and Swinton 
2003), the vector 𝑧1 explaining conservation investment includes household head’s 
characteristics such as gender (i.e., 1 if male and 0 if female) and age since male-headed 
households and older farmers might have higher possibility of renting and therefore lower 
probability of conservation investment (e.g., Shaban 1987; Ray 2005); household characteristics 
such as number of working members in the household; plough ownership (i.e., 1 if the household 
owns a tractor or a plough-yoke and 0 if otherwise); and measures of dependency on agriculture 
such as primary occupation (i.e., 1 if the household head is primarily a farmer and 0 if otherwise) 
which might increase the amount of rented land,16 and logged per-capita landholding of the 
household in order to control for the possibility that larger farmers are more likely to rent less 
(e.g., Eskander and Barbier 2016; Rahman 2010). On the other hand, the vector 𝑧2 explaining 
human capital investment includes gender, logged years of schooling and age of the household 
head, number of school-going girls in the household, logged per-capita landholding of the 
household, and primary occupation. In both the vectors, we control for districts and survey years 
to account for any variation specific to regions and survey years. 
For identification of the 3SLS model, we exclude “years of schooling” of the household head 
and “number of school-going girls” from 𝑧1, both having statistically significant correlation with 
tenure security; whereas “years of schooling” has statistically insignificant correlation with 
conservation investment, and “number of school-going girls”, which is a measure of investment 
in human capital development of the future generation, may not have a causal relationship with 
conservation investment. On the other hand, we exclude “number of working members” and 
                                                          
16 We derive the number of working members as the difference between household size and number of school-going 
children. This is an upper-bound estimate since very old people and very little children may also be included as 
working members.  
15 
 
“plough ownership” from 𝑧2, both having statistically significant correlation with tenure security 
but not necessarily with human capital investment: “number of working members” has 
statistically insignificant correlation with human capital investment and “plough ownership” may 
not have a causal relationship with human capital investment.  
 
IV. DATA 
We use data from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES), which is the primary 
source of household-level socio-economic data in Bangladesh. We chose Bangladesh for two 
reasons. First, the availability of HIES dataset. We use three recent HIES datasets from survey 
years 2000, 2005 and 2010 with corresponding sample sizes of 7,440, 10,080 and 10,200. 
Second, our theoretical model fits perfectly for the case of Bangladesh, which is a densely 
populated country with high dependency on agriculture, especially in its rural areas. In 2009, 
agriculture employed around 44 percent of the labor force in Bangladesh and contributed around 
20 percent of its gross domestic product (BBS 2010). Due to high level of land fragmentation 
and increasing population, among many other reasons, Bangladesh has one of the lowest average 
farm sizes in the world, estimated at 0.85 acres per rural household (BBS 2014; Rahman 2010). 
Farmers often rent lands to increase their operational farm size: in 2008, 33.8 percent of rural 
households in Bangladesh rent at least a part of their total operated land (BBS 2014).17 
Sustainability of land and soil resources becomes difficult if the farmers do not operate on their 
own land and therefore do not have sufficient incentive to adopt conservation practices (e.g., 
Deininger, Jin, and Yadav 2013; Jacoby and Mansuri 2008; Ray 2005). It is most likely that 
owner-farmers have the best incentive to conserve their soil resources because they have more 
freedom in their production plans than tenant-farmers.  
Table 1 describes the dependent and explanatory variables used in our empirical analysis. 
Our conceptual framework necessitates using the sample of rural households with agricultural 
activities, defined as 1 if the household lives in a rural location and 0 if otherwise. Rural 
households are predominantly agricultural, and lack schooling and ownership to key means to 
agricultural production. Table 1 reports that 48 percent of these rural households are primarily 
                                                          
17 Agricultural Census 2008 carried out by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) found that the 66.2 percent of 
the rural agricultural households operated owned lands only, whereas 24.2 percent operated a combination of owned 
and rented lands. In addition, 9.6 percent of them operated only rented lands (BBS 2014).  
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agricultural households, whereas other also have agricultural activities. Only 49 percent of them 
own a tractor or a plough-yoke. On average, household heads are 44.24 years old and have only 
3 years of schooling. Average household size is 4.92, which consists of 3.91 earning members 
and 1 student members. On average, each household annually spends Taka 206 on conservation 
and 2,948 on human capital development. Average landholding is 26.2 decimals and households 
rent in 11.26 decimals of land on average. The average tenure security is 0.85, i.e., the surveyed 
agricultural households own 85 percent of their operated lands.  
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As Appendix Table A2 shows, tenure security is significantly determined by the components of 
vectors 𝑧1 and 𝑧2.
18 Therefore, our choice of 3SLS method is valid since it controls for 
endogeneity in tenure security when simultaneously determining optimal conservation and 
human capital investments in the third stage. Table 2 reports the key parameter estimates from 
the results based on (8). We do not report the survey year and district dummies, but they are 
available upon request. 𝑅2 values are 0.164 and 0.330, respectively. Following discussion of 
results focuses only on our testable hypothesis, i.e., effects of tenure security on conservation and 
human capital investments.  
Results in Table 2 support our testable hypothesis. First, we identify a significant and 
positive association between tenure security and conservation investment, i.e., ?̂?1 > 0. In 
particular, a unit increase in tenure security is significantly associated with a 0.54 percent 
increase in conservation investment in the form of money spent on forest seedlings and compost 
fertilizer (Column 1 in Table 2).19 Next, tenure security and human capital investment have a 
significant and negative association, i.e., ?̂?2 < 0. Results show that a unit increase in tenure 
security is significantly associated with a 0.16 percent decrease in human capital investment in 
the form of money spent on children’s education (Column 2 in Table 2).  
                                                          
18 As predicted in Section III, we find that age, number of working members, landholding, plough ownership, 
dependence on agriculture, years of schooling and number of school-going girls all to influence tenure security 
positively. We also find that male-headed households rent less percentage of their operated lands. 
19 This result is consistent with Grimm and Klasen (2015) who found that the adoption of formal land rights is 
associated with increased expenditures in conservation such as investments in trees, terraces, ditches, and irrigation 
systems. 
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Our findings that ?̂?1 > 0 and ?̂?2 < 0 imply that the effects of tenure security are opposite on 
conservation and human capital investments. Therefore, there exists a tradeoff between these two 
forms of intergenerational transfers. Although primary schooling is free and compulsory in 
Bangladesh, which implies that private educational expenditures are often not necessary rather 
supplementary at the early levels of schooling, however, beyond primary schooling, parents need 
to allocate a considerable amount of money on their school-going children, which, according to 
our results, might not be possible without sacrificing soil conservation investments. In related 
literature, Larson and Bromley (1990) found that the private property regimes are better for 
natural resource conservation. The tradeoff we identify implies that this proposition holds even 
when the farmers have given the option to substitute conservation investment for human capital 
investment. 
Therefore, Bangladeshi agricultural households experience a tradeoff between conservation 
and human capital investments emerging from tenure insecurity: given the level of tenure 
insecurity, an increase (decrease) in conservation investment must be accompanied by a decrease 
(increase) in human capital investment, and vice-versa. Substitutability between these two forms 
of intergenerational transfer leads to important implications for developing countries in terms of 
both private educational expenditure and land resource management, especially since public and 
private investments are complementary. We infer that public policies targeting the conservation 
and management of land and soil resources, which necessarily releases, at least partly, farmers of 
their burden of private conservation investment, may result in higher private investment on 
children’s human capital development.  
Similarly, higher public investment in education may increase conservation investment. We 
investigate whether the female secondary school stipend (FSSS) program of the government of 
Bangladesh reduces the existing tradeoff. FSSS program provides stipend to female students 
attending grades 6 to 12, and therefore necessarily releases agricultural households from the 
burden of financing post-primary education of their girls. We follow specification (8); however, 
we additionally include logged per-student receipt of FSSS and its interaction with tenure 
security as explanatory variables. Table 3 displays the results, where we only report the 
coefficient of interest. Note that, because of the absence of girl students attending grades 6 to 12 
in most of the agricultural households, we only have 1,442 valid observations for this restricted 
specification of our regression model. All the coefficients of interest are statistically significant 
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for conservation investment. Although the negative coefficient of the interaction between Tenure 
security and logged per-student receipt of FSSS implies that at the effect of tenure security on 
conservation investment diminishes with FSSS, we find at the mean value of logged per-student 
receipt of FSSS that a unit increase in tenure security is significantly associated with an 8.85 
percent increase in conservation investment. On the other hand, all the coefficients of interest are 
statistically insignificant for human capital investment, although there is a 0.044 percent increase 
in human capital investment associated with a unit increase in tenure security. Overall, we infer 
that public policies targeting the improvement and development human capital such as the FSSS 
program necessarily release the agricultural households of the tradeoff between conservation and 
human capital investments for a given degree of tenure security, and thereby enable them to 
increase their conservation investment.  
Finally, although usually households spend money on human capital development if they 
have school-going children, in rural economy, people often transfer resources to their extended 
family members such as grandchildren and in-laws (Cox and Fafchamps 2007). For example, 
Duflo (2003) found evidence that South African grandparents finance their grandchildren’s 
consumption of food and nutrients. In addition, Angelucci et al. (2010) identified that in rural 
Mexico, resource reallocation by extended family members affect children’s schooling choices. 
Consistent with these practices among the extended family members, who do not necessarily 
dine-in together, often finance the human capital development of the future generation. 
Therefore, to further validate our findings, we restrict our estimation to the households with 
school-going children only. 3SLS regression results in Table 4 show that the underlying tradeoff 
still holds: ?̂?1 > 0 and ?̂?2 < 0 imply that the effects of tenure security are opposite on 
conservation and human capital investments even after taking off the possibility of investing in 
the human capital development of the children from extended family. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
We develop an overlapping generation model of rural agricultural households to investigate 
the tradeoff between alternative modes of transfer, unexploited topsoil and human capital 
investment. Tenure security influences the underlying tradeoff, resulting in the current 
generation increasing conservation effort and decreasing human capital investment under greater 
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tenure security. Consequently, the current generation switches from human capital investment to 
topsoil transfer under greater tenure security, when the modes of transfer are substitutable.  
Based on our theoretical findings and data availability, we hypothesize that more secure 
tenure is associated with higher conservation investment and lower human capital investment. 
We use the Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) dataset, which 
contains data on household’s expenditure on conservation investment (e.g., spending on forest 
seedling and compost fertilizer) and human capital investment (e.g., spending on children’s 
educational and recreational activities), to test this hypothesis empirically. Our regression results 
suggest that this hypothesis cannot be rejected. We find that households with more secure tenure 
have higher conservation and lower human capital investments. Statistically significant and 
opposite effects on tenure security on conservation and human capital investments suggest that 
households may make tradeoffs between these two modes of transfer based on the security of 
their land tenure. Households with better tenure secure may be choosing increased soil 
conservation over human capital investment as a means of wealth transfer to the next generation.  
Our paper has some limitations, which might open up avenues for future research using 
either better datasets or different case studies. First, our testable hypothesis can be investigated 
for different definitions of tenure security and soil conservation measures. As it is evident in 
literature, results might vary for different definitions; however, since our definitions are valid for 
many developing countries, our results are important and contribute in literature. Second, based 
on data availability, a better focus might be given on the indirect effects of public interventions 
on educational development, such as the FSSS program in our paper, on private investment in 
soil conservation. We follow specification (8) for our estimations reported in Table 3, although 
there is a possibility that the sample of FSSS is biased. However, we restrict our estimation to 
specification (8) due to the unavailability of data on household’s social influence, which is the 
main determinant of the receipts of public funds.  
Despite these limitations, we make important contributions in literature by identifying the 
tradeoff between different modes of intergenerational transfer for a given degree of tenure 
security, and also by identifying the role of public interventions to overcome that tradeoff. 
Altruistic households typically want their children to have a better education, presumably to 
increase their economic opportunities beyond subsistence agriculture, as is evident in our 
empirical analysis. However, any increase in human capital investment will have to be made at 
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the expense of lower conservation investment. This result has important implications for 
conservation and development. Increased public expenditure in education may potentially reduce 
the spending by agricultural households on their children’s schooling, as well as possibly 
releasing children from providing unpaid agricultural and domestic labor (Admassie 2003; 
Pallage and Zimmermann 2007). In addition, expanding public education might enable 
households to transfer more funds to soil and land resources conservation from human capital 
investment, potentially without hurting the human capital development of their children. Finally, 
households with more secure tenure that are investing in greater soil conservation as a means of 
transferring wealth could see the efficiency of their investments improve considerably with more 
public assistance in the form of soil and water conservation demonstration projects, better 
dissemination of farm-level conservation technologies, improved access to credit to finance such 
investments, and support from conservation research and extension activities directed at rural 
smallholders (Barrett and Bevis 2015; Wall 2007). 
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Figure 2. Distributions of outcome variables 
 
  
23 
 
TABLES 
 
Table 1 - Description and Summary Statistics 
      
Variables Description Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Minimu
m 
Maximu
m  
Conservation Investment Total money spent on forest seedling and 
compost fertilizer 
206.10 1059.52 
0 34000 
Human Capital Investment Total money spent on children’s schooling 2948.33 7897.21 0 243000 
Landholding Amount of agricultural land owned (decimals¥) 26.20 104.87 0 3200 
Rented land Amount of agricultural rented in (decimals) 11.26 44.07 0 1680 
Tenure Security Tenure security of operated agricultural land  0.85 0.29 0.001 1 
Gender  Dummy: 1 if male-headed household, 0 if 
female-headed household 
0.96 0.21 
0 1 
Age Age, in completed years, of the household head 44.24 12.67 12 99 
Household Size Number of members in the household 4.92 2.00 1 25 
Earning members Number of working age or income earning 
members in the household 
3.91 1.74 
0 20 
Student members Number of school-going members in the 
household 
1.01 1.11 
0 10 
Years of schooling Years of schooling of the household head 2.99 4.20 0 16 
Plough Ownership 1 if the household owns a tractor or a plough-
yoke and 0 if otherwise 
0.45 0.50 
0 1 
Agricultural household  1 if Agriculture is the primary occupation of the 
household head, 0 if otherwise 
0.48 0.50 
0 1 
Female stipend  Amount of female secondary school stipend 
(taka) 
61.63 280.46 
0 11000 
Notes: Total sample size is 16,410. All monetary units are expressed in Bangladeshi taka. We restrict the estimating 
sample to rural households with agricultural activities to fit the conceptual framework in Section II. We define 
“Rural Household” as 1 if the household lives in rural areas and 0 if otherwise.  
¥ 100 decimals = 1 acre. 
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Table 2 - 3SLS Regression Results 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Ln(Conservation Investment) Ln(Human Capital Investment) 
   
Tenure security  0.538*** -0.158* 
 (0.205) (0.085) 
Gender  -0.290** 0.212* 
 (0.118) (0.112) 
Age  -0.011 0.091*** 
 (0.010) (0.020) 
(Age)2  0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Working Members -0.025  
 (0.034)  
(Working Members)2 0.003  
 (0.003)  
Ln(P/C landholding) -0.098 0.328*** 
 (0.119) (0.069) 
(Ln(P/C landholding))2 0.007 -0.044** 
 (0.019) (0.017) 
Plough ownership 0.165  
 (0.112)  
Agricultural households -0.027 -0.072 
 (0.053) (0.047) 
Ln(years of schooling)  0.308*** 
  (0.023) 
Number of school-going girls  1.088*** 
  (0.182) 
(Number of school-going girls)2  -0.202*** 
  (0.049) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -2.095*** -2.629*** 
 (0.234) (0.174) 
Constant 4.520*** 2.319*** 
 (0.553) (0.675) 
   
Observations 16,410 16,410 
R2 0.164 0.330 
District dummies YES YES 
HIES dummies YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors in (), with ***, ** and * representing levels of statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. We restrict the estimating sample to rural households to fit the conceptual framework. Dependent 
variables are logged expenditures on forest seedling and compost fertilizer (Column 1), and logged expenditures on 
education (Column 2). 
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Table 3 - Implications of Public Expenditure on Education 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Ln(Conservation Investment) Ln(Human Capital Investment) 
   
Tenure security  10.934*** 0.058 
 (2.936) (1.640) 
Ln(per-student FSSS) 2.054*** 0.267 
 (0.433) (0.264) 
Tenure security * Ln(per-student FSSS)  -2.078*** -0.014 
 (0.485) (0.295) 
   
Observations 1,442 1,442 
R2 0.236 0.179 
Notes: Standard errors in (), with ***, ** and * representing levels of statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. We restrict the estimating sample to rural households who receive female secondary school stipend.  
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Table 4 - 3SLS Regression Results 
(households with school-going children only) 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Ln(Conservation Investment) Ln(Human Capital Investment) 
   
Tenure security  0.577* -0.071 
 (0.332) (0.068) 
Gender  -0.243 0.013 
 (0.178) (0.106) 
Age  -0.001 0.094*** 
 (0.015) (0.011) 
(Age)2  0.000 -0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Working Members -0.023  
 (0.045)  
(Working Members)2 0.003  
 (0.004)  
Ln(P/C landholding) -0.090 0.247*** 
 (0.190) (0.055) 
(Ln(P/C landholding))2 0.007 -0.019 
 (0.028) (0.014) 
Plough ownership 0.137  
 (0.164)  
Agricultural households 0.008 -0.072* 
 (0.083) (0.040) 
Ln(years of schooling)  0.357*** 
  (0.019) 
Number of school-going girls  -0.028 
  (0.058) 
(Number of school-going girls)2  0.041** 
  (0.020) 
Inverse Mills Ratio -2.229*** -4.928*** 
 (0.409) (0.380) 
Constant 4.375*** 3.264*** 
 (0.785) (0.348) 
   
Observations 9,652 9,652 
R2 0.182 0.252 
District dummies YES YES 
HIES dummies YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors in (), with ***, ** and * representing levels of statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. We restrict the estimating sample to rural households with school-going children. Dependent variables 
are logged expenditures on forest seedling and compost fertilizer (Column 1), and logged expenditures on education 
(Column 2). 
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APPENDICES  
 
Table A1 - Participation Decisions: Bivariate Probit Regression 
 (1) (2) 
Variables Conservation investment Human capital investment 
   
Tenure security  -1.019*** -0.220*** 
 (0.077) (0.050) 
Gender  0.331*** 0.383*** 
 (0.077) (0.058) 
Age  0.022*** 0.163*** 
 (0.006) (0.007) 
(Age)2  -0.000*** -0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Working Members 0.044* -0.075*** 
 (0.023) (0.027) 
(Working Members)2 -0.001 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Ln(P/C landholding) 0.524*** 0.217*** 
 (0.054) (0.041) 
(Ln(P/C landholding))2 -0.067*** -0.046*** 
 (0.012) (0.010) 
Plough ownership 0.494*** 0.138*** 
 (0.059) (0.052) 
Agricultural households 0.231*** -0.069*** 
 (0.029) (0.026) 
Ln(years of schooling) 0.089*** 0.095*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) 
Number of school-going girls 0.066 2.459*** 
 (0.041) (0.086) 
(Number of school-going girls)2 -0.005 -0.496*** 
 (0.015) (0.028) 
   
HIES dummies YES YES 
   
District dummies YES YES 
   
Constant -1.669*** -4.094*** 
 (0.281) (0.235) 
   
Observations 16,410 16,410 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at union level are in (), with ***, ** and * representing levels of statistical 
significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. We restrict the estimating sample to rural households to fit the 
conceptual framework. Binary dependent variables are conservation investment (i.e., 1 if positive conservation 
investment and 0 if zero conservation investment) in Column 1, and human capital investment (i.e., 1 if positive 
human capital investment and 0 if zero human capital investment) in Column 2. 
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Table A2 – First-stage of the 3SLS Regression Model 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables ln(Conservation investment)  ln(Human capital investment) Tenure security 
Gender  -0.159 
(0.098) 
0.277** 
(0.121) 
0.330*** 
(0.002) 
Age  -0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.100*** 
(0.021) 
0.021*** 
(0.000) 
(Age)2  0.000* 
(0.000) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
0.000*** 
(0.000) 
Working Members 0.001 
(0.034) 
-0.174*** 
(0.042) 
0.043*** 
(0.001) 
(Working Members)2 0.002 
(0.003) 
0.016*** 
(0.004) 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
Ln(P/C landholding) 0.158** 
(0.063) 
0.251*** 
(0.078) 
0.502*** 
(0.001) 
(Ln(P/C landholding))2 -0.022 
(0.014) 
-0.035** 
(0.018) 
-0.063*** 
(0.000) 
Plough ownership 0.390*** 
(0.080) 
-0.046 
(0.099) 
0.424*** 
(0.002) 
Agricultural households 0.107** 
(0.044) 
-0.114** 
(0.054) 
0.217*** 
(0.001) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 1 -1.413*** 
(0.083) 
-0.203** 
(0.102) 
1.190*** 
(0.002) 
Ln(years of schooling) 0.032 
(0.019) 
0.294*** 
(0.024) 
0.083*** 
(0.000) 
Number of school-going girls -0.276* 
(0.153) 
1.173*** 
(0.188) 
0.064*** 
(0.003) 
(Number of school-going girls)2 0.077* 
(0.041) 
-0.226*** 
(0.050) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 2 -0.310** 
(0.147) 
-2.525*** 
(0.181) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
Constant  4.162*** 
(0.577) 
2.619*** 
(0.711) 
-2.455*** 
(0.011) 
R2 0.168 0.331 0.978 
Notes: Standard errors in (), with ***, ** and * representing levels of statistical significance of 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. We restrict the estimating sample to rural households to fit the conceptual framework. Dependent 
variables are logged expenditures on forest seedling and compost fertilizer (Column 1), logged expenditures on 
education (Column 2), and tenure security (Column 3). 
 
 
 
